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Withholding treatment
Nicola Peart, the University of Otago draws lessons
from the Aintree case
O
n 30 October 2013 the Supreme Court of the
United Kingdom issued its first judgment under the
Mental Capacity Act 2005 in respect of a seriously
ill man who lacked capacity to make decisions about his
medical treatment: Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foun-
dation Trust v James [2013] UKSC 67. The Hospital sought
a declaration that it would be in the best interests of Mr David
James to withhold specified life sustaining treatments if the
need for such treatments should arise. His family opposed
the application. The High Court declined the Hospital’s
application on 6 December 2012: [2012] EWHC 3524. The
Court of Appeal reversed that decision 15 days later, giving
their reasons the following March: [2013] EWCA Civ 65. On
31 December 2012 Mr James died following a cardiac arrest.
In view of the importance of the issues and the different
approaches taken in the lower courts, the Supreme Court
gave Mr James’ widow leave to appeal the Court of Appeal
decision.
THE FACTS
At the time of the High Court hearing in December 2012
Mr James was in a critical care unit entirely dependent on
artificial ventilation and on a nasogastric tube for nutrition
and hydration. Following treatment in May 2012 for a
problem with a stoma, that was inserted in 2001 to treat his
colon cancer, Mr James developed an infection and chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease. He also suffered an acute
kidney injury and his blood pressure was persistently low. He
was admitted to the critical care unit and placed on a venti-
lator. Between May 2012 and the High Court hearing seven
months later, Mr James had several major set backs: a cardiac
arrest, a stroke, which left him partially paralysed, and
recurring infections that caused septic shock and multiple
organ failure. At the time of the hearing he was not on
antibiotics and was able to tolerate at least 12 hours on a
lesser form of supported breathing. But he was unable to sit
or stand by himself because of severe muscle wasting. Bad
cramps were painful and distressing to him and his kidney
function was very fragile. Daily care tasks caused discomfort,
pain and suffering. His prognosis was grim. It was almost
inevitable that he would develop further infections, leading
to low blood pressure and further organ failure. His consult-
ants and the independent specialist appointed by the Official
Solicitor acting on behalf of Mr James all agreed on the
diagnosis and that his prospects of leaving the critical care
unit were extremely low.
Everyone, including his family, agreed that he had a severe
neurological impairment, which rendered him incompetent
to make decisions about his medical treatment. He was
diagnosed as being in a “minimally conscious state”, even
though he recognised his wife and son and was pleased to see
them. He was able to kiss his wife when she leaned into him,
look at her when she moved around the bed, and mouth what
appeared to be words in response to this wife. He could turn
the pages of a newspaper, smiling as he did so, put his glasses
on and take them off, and he appeared to enjoy watching
videos. As the Court explained in W v M [2011] EWHC
2443, the minimally conscious state covers a broad spec-
trum, ranging from just above the vegetative state to almost
full consciousness. In Mr James’ case, the High Court held
that his state might be more accurately described as “very
limited”, rather than minimal, consciousness.
THE APPLICATION
The Hospital filed its proceedings in September 2012, at a
time when Mr James’ condition was fluctuating. It sought a
declaration under s 15 of the Mental Capacity Act that
Mr James lacked capacity to consent to or refuse medical
treatment. That was uncontentious. The hospital also sought
a declaration that it would be lawful to withhold invasive
support for circulatory problems, renal replacement therapy,
and cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) in the event of a
clinical deterioration. The unanimous view of Mr James’
clinical team was that it would not be in his best interests to
receive these treatments if his condition deteriorated to the
extent that he needed them. The treatments would be extremely
burdensome for Mr James and futile, as there was no pros-
pect of recovery. The Official Solicitor endorsed the medical
view but the family disagreed. While they accepted that
Mr James would never recover his previous quality of life,
they felt that he derived enjoyment from seeing his family and
friends. He had been determined to beat his cancer a decade
earlier and the family believed he would feel the same way
about his current condition.
HIGH COURT DECISION
Despite the unanimous medical view, Jackson J declined the
Hospital’s application. His Lordship was not persuaded that
the specified treatments would be futile, overly burdensome,
or that there was no prospect of recovery. While the treat-
ments would not restore Mr James to full health, he had
benefited from them in the past. They had allowed him to
resume a quality of life that was worthwhile to him, as
evidenced by the enjoyment he derived from his family. The
burdens of the treatments had to be weighed against the
benefits of continuing his life. It was too soon to conclude
that he would not derive benefit from these treatments in the
future, although Jackson J thought it unlikely that further
CPR would be in his best interests in view of the burdensome
nature of the treatment and the likely further deterioration in
Mr James’ condition following CPR. Even so, his Lordship
refused to allow the Hospital to put a “Do Not Resuscitate”
instruction on Mr James’ medical record.
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COURT OF APPEAL
In the two weeks between the High Court and Court of
Appeal hearings, Mr James’ condition deteriorated dramati-
cally. CPR was by then highly likely to fail or leave him with
greater brain damage and further organ damage. Although
he was comatose or semi-comatose, the treatments he had
received in the two weeks following the High Court decision
had clearly caused him great distress and discomfort. He was
extremely weak and no longer able to come off mechanical
ventilation. In view of Mr James’ poor condition, the Court
of Appeal arranged an urgent hearing and granted the Hos-
pital’s application the same day, making the declaration in
the terms sought by the Hospital.
The Court of Appeal disagreed not only with the High
Court’s decision but also with its approach to the applica-
tion. Sir Alan Ward and Laws LJ concluded that the treat-
ments were futile and overly burdensome. The test of futility
was not whether Mr James could recover a quality of life
worthwhile to him, but whether the treatment itself had the
real prospect of curing or at least palliating the life-
threatening disease or illness from which he was suffering.
Recovery referred to his medical interests and in that sense
the specified treatments were futile. He would never recover
sufficiently to go home and, given that context, the treat-
ments were overly burdensome.
Arden LJ reached the same conclusion, but approached
the matter from the point of view of the patient’s presumed
wishes. If the patient’s actual wishes were unknown or open
to doubt, then the Court had to proceed on the assumption
that the patient would act as a reasonable person would act.
As the treatment would be overly burdensome, any reason-
able person in Mr James’ circumstances would reject it. It
would therefore not be in Mr James’ best interests to give the
treatment.
SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court was unanimous in rejecting the widow’s
appeal, but it disagreed with the Court of Appeal’s reasons,
preferring instead the approach adopted by the High Court.
The question
Lady Hale, giving judgment on behalf of a Bench of five
Judges, started by reframing the question in response to
which the declaration was sought. Reiterating the point
made by the House of Lords in Airedale NHS Trust v Bland
[1993] AC 789, the question was not whether withdrawing
or withholding treatment was lawful, but whether providing
or continuing treatment was lawful. The Court’s powers
under the Mental Capacity Act were no greater than the
patient would have if he had capacity. It had no power to
order the doctors to give particular forms of treatment. Its
role was merely to determine whether the giving of specified
treatments was in the best interests of a patient who lacked
capacity to decide for himself. If the treatments were in the
patient’s best interests, then the doctors were authorised to
provide them. If the treatments were not in the patient’s best
interests, the Court could not give consent on the patient’s
behalf. It would then be unlawful to give the treatment and
lawful to withhold or withdraw the treatment.
Patient’s best interests
Section 4 of the Mental Capacity Act provides a procedural
framework for deciding an incapacitated person’s best inter-
ests. The starting point is that every person is presumed to
have capacity. To that end, decision-makers must do what
they can to enable and encourage, or improve the ability of
the person to participate in decisions affecting the person.
Second, where the determination relates to life-sustaining
treatment, decision-makers must not be motivated by a desire
to bring about the person’s death. Third, they must consider
all relevant circumstances, and in particular:
• whether it is likely that the person will at some time
have capacity in relation to the matter and, if so, when
that is likely to be;
• whether the person had expressed any wishes or feel-
ings, in particular any relevant written statement;
• what beliefs and values would be likely to influence the
person’s decision, if he had capacity, and any other
factors he would be likely to consider if he were able to
do so.
If it is practicable and appropriate, the person determining an
incapacitated person’s best interests must consult anyone
named by the person as someone to consult on the matter
and anyone engaged in caring for the person or interested in
his welfare, and take into account their views about what
would be in the person’s best interests, in particular as to the
person’s wishes, feelings, beliefs and values.
The focus is clearly on the particular individual for whom
the decision has to be made, in this case Mr James. His best
interests must be determined from his point of view, includ-
ing his medical and non-medical circumstances, his wishes,
beliefs, values, likes and dislikes, as well as any altruistic
sentiments and concerns he may have for others that might
influence his decision if he had capacity. The test is subjec-
tive, not objective. The Supreme Court disagreed with Arden
LJ that, if his wishes were not known, the test was what a
reasonable person in Mr James’ position would want. Every
person is different and each case must be decided on its own
particular facts.
Beyond providing a framework for decision-making, the
Act provides no guidance on the meaning of “best interests”.
While there is a strong presumption in favour of life, that
presumption does not apply if it is not in a patient’s best
interests to receive life-sustaining treatment. Best interests
required an assessment of the patient’s welfare in the widest
sense: his medical, social and psychological welfare. Decision-
makers had to consider the nature of the medical treatment,
what it involved, its prospect of success, and the likely
outcome of treatment for Mr James. If it was of no benefit to
Mr James, it was futile. Decision-makers also had to take
account of Mr James’ social and psychological welfare. His
condition was fluctuating and, while the treatments were
burdensome, two of the treatments had been used success-
fully in the past. They had restored him to a life that Mr James
would regard as worthwhile, enabling him to continue enjoy-
ing family life that was “of the closest and most meaningful
kind”. Lady Hale thus endorsed Jackson J’s approach and
understood why his Lordship had concluded that it was
premature not to treat Mr James if the need should arise.
However, in view of Jackson J’s comment that CPR was
unlikely to benefit Mr James, Lady Hale commented that she
would probably have decided that providing CPR was not in
his best interests and its provision would therefore be unlaw-
ful.
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COMMENT
Although this case was decided under the Mental Capacity
Act, its reasoning is consistent with and draws on the reason-
ing of the House of Lords in Airedale NHS Trust v Bland,
both in terms of the framing of the question and the wide
view of the patient’s interests. However, it differs from Bland
in two important respects. First, Aintree was not about
withdrawing treatment, but about withholding invasive treat-
ment should it be required. Indeed, Lady Hale was emphatic
in stating that there was no suggestion of withdrawing either
ventilation or nutrition and hydration from Mr James. Sec-
ondly, the withholding of treatment in this case required
careful balancing of the benefits and burdens of treatment,
whereas in Bland no such balancing was required because of
his medical condition. Mr Bland had no quality of life and no
prospect of recovering any quality of life that might be
worthwhile to him. There was therefore no benefit in con-
tinuing to treat him. The Aintree decision is therefore an
important addition to the developing jurisprudence about
the lawfulness of providing treatment to incompetent patients.
Furthermore, while both Bland and Aintree involved deci-
sions about end of life medical treatment, the reasoning in
Aintree, especially, would apply also to other types of medi-
cal treatment for incompetent persons.
LESSONS FOR NEW ZEALAND
Aintree provides valuable insights for end of life decision-
making in New Zealand. First, the way that the Supreme
Court framed the question focuses on the lawfulness of
providing the treatment, rather than on the withholding or
withdrawing of treatment. The attention then is on the
benefits and burdens of treatment rather than on bringing
about the patient’s death, with all the controversy that issue
entails. That was not how the question was framed in Auckland
Area Health Board v Attorney General [1993] 1 NZLR 235
(hereafter Re L). While Re L involved the withdrawal of life
sustaining treatment, rather than the withholding of life
saving treatment, that distinction should not affect the way
the question is posed.
In Re L the patient suffered from an extreme case of
Guillain-Barré Syndrome. He could not move or communi-
cate and was wholly dependent on artificial ventilation.
Without the ventilator that artificially maintained his heart
and breathing, he would be dead. Eight specialists had exam-
ined him and were unanimous in their view that Mr L had no
prospect of recovery and that there was no medical or
therapeutic benefit in maintaining the artificial ventilation.
As ventilation could not be medically justified, the doctors
decided that it should be withdrawn.
The approach that the doctors took in deciding about
Mr L’s ongoing treatment accords with the approach that
Lady Hale took in Aintree. But it was not the way the
question was eventually put to the Court. Concerned about
the risk of criminal liability for culpable homicide, the Auckland
Area Health Board applied for a declaratory order that the
withdrawal of artificial ventilation from Mr L would not be
in breach of ss 151 and 164 of the Crimes Act 1961. To avoid
impinging on prosecutorial discretion, the Court made an
order declaring that the withdrawal of ventilation would not
constitute culpable homicide if there were no reasonable
possibility of recovery and no therapeutic or medical benefit
in continuing ventilation and withdrawing ventilation accorded
with good medical practice. A further condition was that
Mrs L and the Ethics Committee of the Auckland Area
Health Board concurred with the doctors’ decision to with-
draw artificial ventilation from Mr L. As all of these condi-
tions were satisfied in this case, the doctors’ decision to
withdraw ventilation was lawful.
Had the Court been asked whether continuing ventilation
was lawful, it would have had to conclude that it was not.
The medical specialists were unanimous in their view that
maintaining ventilation was medically futile. Mrs L sup-
ported the decision to withdraw treatment, which suggests
that she did not believe that Mr L had a quality of life that he
might consider worthwhile. Although his life might be arti-
ficially sustained indefinitely and perhaps for a very long
time, the complete disconnect between his brain and his body
meant that he had no quality of life. Accordingly, the con-
tinuation of ventilation was not in his best interests. While
the outcome would have been the same, if the question had
been framed as Lady Hale did in Aintree the Court’s atten-
tion would have been fully directed at the interests of the
patient rather than the doctors’ fear of prosecution. The
Court might then also have taken account of factors other
than the medical utility of treatment.
Re G [1997] 2 NZLR 201 was also about withdrawal of
treatment, but in this case it was terminating artificial hydra-
tion and nutrition. Mr G was almost in a persistent vegetative
state following a car accident. On the current classification of
consciousness, Mr G was probably in a minimally conscious
state rather than a persistent vegetative state. Unlike Mr James
though, Mr G was at the lowest level of awareness. His
family sought two orders. The first was an order under the
Court’s parens patriae jurisdiction consenting on behalf of
Mr G to the withdrawal of hydration and nutrition. The
second order was a declaration that the withdrawal of hydra-
tion and nutrition was lawful. The Court granted the first
order. Although Mr G had never expressed his wishes on
what should be done if he were ever to be in the condition he
was in, the overwhelming evidence from family, friends and
colleagues was that he would not want treatment to con-
tinue. Having consented on behalf of Mr G, there was no
need for a declaration that the withdrawal of treatment was
lawful. The Court nonetheless made the declaration to reas-
sure the health professionals, but held that it was lawful
because the Court had consented on Mr G’s behalf to the
withdrawal of treatment.
Had the Court been asked whether it was lawful to
continue treating Mr G, it would have concluded that it was
not. In view of his prognosis, and his values, beliefs and views
on how life should be lived, it would not have been in Mr G’s
best interests to continue hydrating and feeding him. For
Mr G this was not a life worth living and hence continuing to
treat him would have been unlawful. As in Re L, if the
question had been whether it was lawful to continue treating
Mr G, the Court’s attention would have been on the conse-
quences of continuing Mr G’s treatment, rather than on the
consequences of withdrawing it.
New Zealand has no exact equivalent to England’s Men-
tal Capacity Act. The Protection of Personal and Property
Rights Act 1988 empowers the Court to order or recommend
that specified medical treatment be provided to a person who
lacks capacity: ss 10 and 13. But unlike England’s Mental
Capacity Act, the PPPR Act does not deal specifically with
end of life decision-making. The Act is also worded in terms
of providing treatment rather than withholding or withdraw-
ing it. The Court’s primary objective under the Act is to make
the least restrictive intervention possible in the incapacitated
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person’s life: s 8. None of these provisions lend themselves to
the kind of decision that the Court was called upon to make
in Re G or Re L, which may explain why the Act was not
relied on in either of the judgments. The Code of Health and
Disability Services Consum-
ers’Rights1996,whichpost-
dates both Re L and Re G,
provides guidance for mak-
ingmedicaldecisions, includ-
ingendof lifedecisions.Right
7 of the Code begins by
stating that services may be
provided only if the con-
sumer (patient) makes an
informed choice and gives informed consent. Right 7(7) gives
patients the right to refuse services and withdraw consent to
services. Like the Mental Capacity Act, Right 7(2) stipulates
that every patient must be presumed to be competent unless
there are reasonable grounds to believe otherwise. Right 7(3)
gives patients with diminished competence the right to make
informed choices and give informed consent to the extent
appropriate to their level of competence. Right 5 gives the
patient the right to effective communication in a form, lan-
guage and manner that enables the consumer to understand
the information provided. Right 5 in combination with Right
7(3) imposes an obligation on healthcare providers to facili-
tate participation by persons of diminished competence in
making a choice and consenting or refusing consent to rec-
ommended treatment.
If the patient lacks competence to consent, and there is no
person lawfully entitled to make decisions on the patient’s
behalf, then Right 7(4) states that treatment may be provided
where (a) it is in the best interests of the patient, and (b)
reasonable steps have been taken to ascertain the patient’s
views. If the patient’s views are known, treatment may be
provided that is consistent with the informed choice that the
patient would make if competent. Requirements (a) and (b)
are cumulative, from which one might infer that a patient’s
views are distinct from the patient’s best interests. That might
suggest that the best interests test is objective, rather than
subjective. However, the duty to provide treatment that is
consistent with the patient’s views must also be in the patient’s
best interests. The two requirements are thus inextricably
linked, which must mean that the best interest test is subjec-
tive, at least to the extent of including the patient’s views. The
Code does not explicitly mention the patient’s feelings, beliefs,
values or any other factors that would be likely to influence
the patient’s decision if he or she had the capacity to make the
decision. While those factors are clearly relevant in ascertain-
ing a person’s views, there is a risk that decision-makers may
focus solely on expressed wishes, rather than considering
more broadly the values, beliefs, concerns and feelings that
the patient would have taken into account in making a
decision. The reasoning in Re G suggests that risk is very
small. It was Mr G’s values and beliefs that persuaded the
Court to consent on his behalf, thereby making the decision
he would have made if he had been competent and giving
effect to his views.
If the patient’s views cannot be ascertained, then treat-
ment can be provided if it is in the patient’s best interests and
the provider takes account of the views of other suitable
persons who are interested in the welfare of the patient and
available to advise the healthcare provider: Right 7(4). Unlike
the Mental Capacity Act, the Code is silent on the nature of
the advice that might be sought from persons with an interest
in the patient’s welfare. The term “welfare” is not defined
and no further guidance is provided as to its meaning. In the
absence of terminology or context qualifying its meaning,
welfare calls for a broad
perspective of the benefits
and burdens of treatment,
including social and psy-
chological factors rel-
evanttotheparticularpatient.
There is little point in con-
sulting other persons solely
on the medical utility of
treatment. It also suggests
that, even where the patient’s views are not known, the best
interests test is a subjective one, directed only to the needs
and interests of the particular patient in that patient’s circum-
stances.
So, even though the Code of Rights is less specific than the
Mental Capacity Act in articulating how a patient’s best
interests and views should be ascertained, the requirements
in Right 7 are consonant with the requirements of the Mental
Capacity Act. The value of the Supreme Court decision in
Aintree is in stating clearly that best interests should be
assessed broadly, that the test is subjective, and that the
primary role of persons interested in the patient’s welfare is
to provide healthcare providers with information about the
patient’s values, feelings, beliefs and concerns to enable the
providers to determine what would be in the best interests of
the patient.
Finally, while the Supreme Court concluded in Aintree
that at the time of the High Court hearing the providing of
treatment, other than perhaps CPR, would have been lawful,
Lady Hale was careful to point out that this conclusion did
not compel or direct doctors to provide such treatment. It
merely authorised the healthcare providers to provide treat-
ment that was in his best interest. Her Ladyship would
therefore have endorsed the decision in Shortland v Northland
Health Ltd [1998] 1 NZLR 433 (CA) where the Court of
Appeal declined to direct Northland Health to provide interim
dialysis treatment to Mr Rau Williams. Mr Williams had end
stage renal failure. He had been assessed as unsuitable for a
kidney transplant and interim dialysis was therefore with-
drawn. The unanimous view of renal physicians throughout
the country was that further dialysis was not in Mr Williams’
best interests. In view of his poor physical and mental state,
dialysis was risky and highly unlikely to improve his quality
of life. His dementia would also make it very difficult for him
to cooperate with the demands of the treatment. As the
doctors had not acted in bad faith or breached any legal duty
in deciding not to accept Mr Williams onto the renal trans-
plant programme and to withdraw interim dialysis, it was
inappropriate for the Court to attempt to direct a doctor as
to what treatment to give to him.
CONCLUSION
The reasoning in Aintree repays careful reading when deci-
sions about withholding or withdrawing of treatment have
to be made. As with the Bland decision, which New Zealand
courts have relied on in several cases, the Aintree decision
provides valuable insights into the meaning of best interests,
how those interests should be determined, and the role of
family members in making decisions about medical treat-
ment for their incompetent loved ones. ❒
this conclusion did not compel or
direct doctors to provide such
treatment
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